EU Energy "De-Russification" Cannot Conceal Its Own Dilemmas

Reprinted from: China Energy News 

January 19, 2026 17:22 Author: Wang Lin

Entering 2026, winter storms and extreme snowfall and blizzard conditions have swept across Europe, with natural gas inventories falling below the historical average for the same period. Europe is once again worried about heating. Although the EU has barely reached an agreement to "completely phase out Russian natural gas by the end of 2027", it still maintains a strong dependence on Russian natural gas so far, merely shifting from pipeline gas to liquefied natural gas (LNG). For the EU, the process of energy de-Russification has not only slowed down continuously but also plunged the European continent into the triple squeeze of political, economic, and social crises.

 "De-Russification" Hits the EU the Hardest

At the European Parliament session held in December 2025, the EU reached an agreement to fully phase out Russian oil and gas. It will ban all imports of Russian LNG by the end of 2026 and stop importing Russian pipeline natural gas by the end of 2027. Specifically, for short-term contracts signed before June 17, 2025, the ban on Russian LNG will take effect on April 25, 2026, and the ban on pipeline natural gas will take effect on June 17, 2026; for long-term contracts signed before June 17, 2025, the ban on Russian LNG will apply from January 1, 2027, and the ban on pipeline natural gas will apply from September 30, 2027.

The European Commission has required member states to submit diversification plans by March 1, 2026, outlining how to replace the remaining Russian natural gas supplies. Although Spain's imports of Russian natural gas declined in 2025, the EU's overall dependence on Russia remains significant, highlighting its dilemma between maintaining energy security and achieving the goal of "de-Russification".

On the one hand, there are serious divisions within the EU. Despite the EU setting a unified deadline, some member states, based on their own energy structures, strongly oppose the "one-size-fits-all" decoupling policy, believing it threatens energy security. On the other hand, in the process of breaking away from dependence on Russia, the EU may face a new risk of single dependence—shifting from dependence on Russia to dependence on U.S. LNG. This shift not only brings more expensive energy with prices subject to the global market but also poses new challenges to the EU's strategic autonomy.

Europe's "de-Russification" has benefited the "business plans" of the United States and Russia: U.S. LNG has seized the European market at a price 30% higher than Russian natural gas, while Russia has accelerated its "pivot to the East", leaving the EU as the "biggest loser". RT (Russia Today) pointed out that the EU's abandonment of Russian pipeline natural gas and shift to more expensive U.S. LNG will lead to a surge in its energy prices and destroy its own economy.

Latest data from Eurostat shows that since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in February 2022, multiple rounds of EU sanctions against Russia have caused the EU countries to suffer export losses of up to 48 billion euros. From January to October 2025, the EU's exports to Russia dropped from 73 billion euros in the same period in 2021 to 25 billion euros, a decrease of 65%.

RIA Novosti reported that among EU countries, Germany has been the most affected, with its exports to Russia falling by 73.6%; Poland's trade revenue with Russia has also dropped sharply by 71.2%; France's exports to Russia have decreased by 70%.

 EU Imports of Russian LNG Increase Instead of Decreasing

Data from the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) shows that in 2025, Russia's exports of pipeline natural gas to Europe fell by 44% compared with 2018, reaching the lowest level since the mid-1970s. However, Russia's seaborne LNG has quickly made up for these gaps, making it the EU's second-largest natural gas supplier after the United States.

Despite the EU's commitment to gradually break away from dependence on Russian energy, EU ports still handled a large amount of LNG from Russia in 2025. According to the latest report from the German non-governmental environmental organization Öko-Institut, EU ports handled 76.1% of the export volume of Russia's flagship Yamal LNG project in 2025, generating approximately 7.2 billion euros in revenue for Russia.

The total export volume of the Yamal LNG project in 2025 was 19.7 million tons, of which 15 million tons were shipped to the EU, accounting for 76.1% of the EU's total LNG imports, up from 75.4% in 2024. The Yamal LNG project accounts for 14.3% of the EU's total global LNG imports, meaning one out of every seven ships arriving at European ports is from this project.

France is the largest importer. In 2025, a total of 87 ships delivered 6.3 million tons of LNG to France's Dunkirk and Montoir-de-Bretagne ports, accounting for 41.7% of the total Yamal LNG exports to the EU. Belgium followed closely, with the port of Zeebrugge being the most active single port, receiving the most Yamal LNG—58 ships delivered 4.2 million tons to the port. Spain's imports of Russian LNG have declined, but in 2025, 38 ships still delivered 2.8 million tons of LNG from the Yamal project to the country's ports.

It is understood that the Yamal LNG project is located in Russia's Arctic region. Its transportation relies on highly specialized icebreakers and the shortest possible routes. Unloading at EU ports allows these transport ships to quickly return to the Arctic to reload more LNG, rather than being tied to a weeks-long voyage to Asia. Currently, there is no more feasible alternative than the short-distance routes to EU ports.

Sebastian Lettmeier, a relevant industry insider, said: "Despite the EU's decision to gradually phase out Russian natural gas, EU ports continue to serve as the 'logistics lungs' for Russian LNG. We are not only customers but also important infrastructure for maintaining the operation of Russia's flagship LNG project."

Oil Price Network pointed out that 2026 will be a crucial year for the global LNG market. It is expected that a large amount of new supplies from the United States and Qatar will enter the market, which may have a certain impact on Russian natural gas.

 Risk of European Natural Gas Shortage Intensifies

As of the third week of January 2026, many European countries including Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands have successively encountered winter storms and extreme snowfall. The UK experienced large-scale power outages and traffic disruptions, and hundreds of thousands of households in some parts of France suffered power cuts. Against this background, Europe's natural gas inventories are already precarious, and the risk of natural gas shortage has intensified.

Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) pointed out that as of the first week of January 2026, the gas storage rate of Europe's underground natural gas storage facilities was only 59.9%, the lowest level since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and about 13% lower than the average reserve level at the beginning of January over the past five years. Germany's gas storage rate dropped to 54.1%, and the Netherlands even had only 46.1%.

The harsh cold weather has driven a surge in European heating demand, exerting tremendous pressure on energy supply. During the 2025 Christmas holiday, Europe's daily natural gas extraction volume hit a record high. Gazprom warned that the natural gas reserves in Europe's underground gas storage facilities during this heating season are declining at an abnormal rate. This "depletion" will not only lead to a decline in EU productivity but also threaten the natural gas supply for ordinary consumers in the harsh winter.

Gábor Czepek, State Secretary of the Hungarian Ministry of Energy, once publicly stated that the EU's wrong energy policy has pushed more and more families into difficulties, and about one-fifth of EU citizens cannot obtain normal heating.

Hungary has threatened to resist the embargo by legal means, Slovakia has criticized the EU policy for "forcing people to burn firewood to survive the winter", while Poland, Denmark, and other countries insist on "short-term pain for long-term security". Divisions within the EU have made European citizens the most direct victims. The average annual energy expenditure of a three-person household in Germany has risen from 4,120 euros in 2021 to 5,407 euros. Firewood prices in Bulgaria have tripled, and low-income families have to collect branches for heating.

Analysts point out that the long-term energy crisis and high costs are subtly eroding Europe's social cohesion and may bring far-reaching structural impacts. Public dissatisfaction is accumulating, with divergent directions: some blame the EU bureaucracy for being out of touch with reality, hastily promoting green transition and sanctions against Russia; others attribute the problem to their own governments' failure to make adequate buffers and reserves. Such divisions are accelerating the erosion of public trust in the EU's common energy policy, while the continuous high energy costs have forced some energy-intensive small and medium-sized enterprises to shrink or close down. In the long run, this will not only weaken the economic vitality of the European region but also exacerbate internal development imbalances.

Editor-in-Charge: Liu Chengyan